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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has found itself under a subtle, non-violent attack
by a rival foreign government. An unprecedented, sustained, and multipronged campaign of activity that does not constitute traditional
military force or espionage threatens to exert a stealthy and nonattributable influence upon American attitudes toward international
affairs at a moment of global crisis. Our adversary seeks to expand its
geographical control and its worldwide influence at the expense of
liberal democratic powers. Institutions at the very core of American
democracy–the news media, lawfully assembled labor and advocacy
organizations, and corporations–are at risk of becoming unwitting tools
of this assault.
The adversary similarly seeks to acquire American scientific and
technical expertise and to use its economic power to affect American
and Western European supply chains. It does so through agents and cooptees who endeavor to procure intellectual property and supplies
without revealing the adversary’s involvement.
The year is 1915. The adversary that has so effectively identified
modes of attack that exploit the inherent openness of democracy and
free-market capitalism is Imperial Germany. The United States has
detected the German influence campaign. No law exists, however, to
support the investigation and disruption of foreign-directed activity
that, if successful, could keep the United States out of the Great War and
hand victory in Europe to the rising German Empire.
In the twenty-first century, the United States similarly confronts a
powerful influence campaign directed by the Russian Federation, which
similarly seeks to expand its geographical control and global influence
to the detriment of democratic nations. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC) presents a different threat that also finds precedent in pre-war
German activity: acquisition of American scientific and technical
knowledge and material. A critical difference today, rooted in the
American response to the German campaign a century ago, is the
availability of instruments of U.S. criminal law that can deter, punish,
and—perhaps most essentially—reveal foreign efforts to subvert
American democracy. This Article discusses one of those tools, which
dates back to the 1917 enactment of the Espionage Act: Title 18, United
States Code, Section 951 (“Section 951”).1 Current and emerging threats

1 Section 951 covers a broader range of activities than the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., and is less widely understood. FARA
and Section 951 are often confused with each other, or erroneously used
interchangeably. Although they have overlapping purposes,
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to U.S. national security bear striking similarities to the pre-World War
I challenges to American socio-political, economic, and technological
leadership and independence. Accordingly, the origin and development
of Section 951 indicate how the statute may be used to counter twentyfirst century threats. Moreover, as noted below, the U.S. Senate has both
recognized the “non-traditional” intelligence threat that Russia and
China present and indicated an intent to review and update Section 951
and FARA. The background set forth herein provides a foundation for
discussion of potential application of the statute and forthcoming
proposals to modify it.
This Article examines the scope of conduct that can predicate
charges of acting as an agent of a foreign government under Section 951,
and explains how the statute has been applied over time to combat
foreign governments’ clandestine activities that fall outside of “classic”
espionage and sabotage efforts. That history provides a view into the
future application of the statute to current and emerging threats. It is
critical for practitioners and potential defendants to appreciate that
conduct that is otherwise non-criminal, or that would otherwise violate
statutes with less significant sentencing exposure, may violate an
important national security statute if undertaken in the United States
secretly on behalf of a foreign government.
Part II provides historical context for the statute. Part III
summarizes how courts and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have
interpreted the scope of conduct that Section 951 proscribes, based on
judicial opinions and DOJ charging decisions. Part IV describes more
recent use of Section 951. Part V discusses how Section 951 can be used
in the future to counter continuing and evolving national security
threats that rely on misattribution, such as influence operations and
misappropriation of American research and intellectual property.
Bearing in mind that Section 951 punishes conduct engaged in as an
agent of a foreign government, and not a defendant’s mere status as such
FARA is designed to encourage transparency by foreign principals
attempting to influence the U.S. government or public through public
speech, political activities, and lobbying through agents in the United
States, not to discourage that conduct itself, [while] Section 951 . . . is used
to prosecute clandestine, espionage-like behavior, information gathering,
and procurement of technology on behalf of foreign governments or
officials. Although Section 951 requires notification to the Attorney
General, the statute is designed to deter and punish wrongful conduct
(namely, engaging in clandestine conduct on behalf of a foreign power).
Oversight of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and Attempts to Influence U.S. Elections:
Lessons Learned from Current and Prior Administrations, U.S. Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary
2 (2017) (statement of Adam S. Hickey, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice).
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an agent, the scope of conduct Section 951 can cover is as broad as the
plain language of the statute. As cases emerge involving “nontraditional collectors,”2 such as “researchers in labs, universities, and
the defense industrial base”3 who operate at the direction of foreign
governments, the century-old Section 951 can under certain
circumstances potentially be used to expose, deter, and punish such
actors’ conduct.
II. BACKGROUND
As described below, the origins of Section 951 trace directly to the
emergence of the United States as a global power just over one hundred
years ago. European powers engaged in the First World War sought to
influence the United States, obtain the benefits of American technology,
industry, and commerce, and disrupt activities in the United States that
could aid their adversaries.
A. Statutory Text
Section 951 provides that:
(a) Whoever, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or
attaché, acts in the United States as an agent of a foreign
government without prior notification to the Attorney
General if required in subsection (b), shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
A “foreign government” includes “any government, faction, or body
of insurgents within a country with which the United States is at peace,
irrespective of recognition by the United States.”4 An “agent of a foreign
government” is defined as “an individual who agrees to operate within
the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign
government or official,” and excludes accredited diplomatic and

2 Non-traditional collectors use “non-traditional methods—both lawful and
unlawful—blending things like foreign investments and corporate acquisitions with
things like cyber intrusions and espionage by corporate insiders.” Christopher Wray,
Responding Effectively to the Chinese Economic Espionage Threat, Department of Justice
China Initiative Conference, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jan. 6, 2020)
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/responding-effectively-to-the-chineseeconomic-espionage-threat.
3 China’s Non‐Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and
Potential Policy Responses, U.S. Sen Comm. on the Judiciary 8 (2018) (statement of John
C. Demers, Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
4 18 U.S.C. § 11.
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consular officers, officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored
representatives of foreign governments, and their non-U.S. citizen staff.5
The definition also excludes individuals engaged solely in legal
commercial transactions.6 A “legal commercial transaction” is “any
exchange, transfer, purchase or sale, of any commodity, service or
property of any kind, including information or intellectual property, not
prohibited by federal or state legislation or implementing regulations.”7
By its terms, Section 951 imposes criminal liability for an
individual’s actions, not his or her nationality, status, or employer.
Moreover, it applies to acts undertaken “in the United States.”8 A
defendant’s agreement to act under the direction or control of a foreign
government, and his or her undertaking actions within the United States
under such direction or control, are key elements of the crime.9 The
scope of conduct and agency relationship that Section 951 covers are
discussed below in the context of the statute’s enactment and
amendment.
B. Context and Legislative History
German activities preceding the United States’ entry into the First
World War gave rise to Section 951’s predecessor. The statute has since
been amended to modify its scope and to transfer responsibility for
notification from the State Department to DOJ.10
1. Before U.S. Entry into the First World War
When the First World War broke out in Europe, the United States
had “substantially no law on the statute books affecting the conduct of
the individual except the Treason Statute, which proved well-nigh
useless, and the Internment Statute, which affected only alien
5

18 U.S.C. § 951(d)(1)-(3). The Attorney General is required to promulgate
regulations establishing notification requirements, and to transmit notifications to the
Secretary of State. 18 U.S.C. § 951(b), (c). Regulations implementing Section 951 and
providing definitions of terms are set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 73.1-6.
6 18 U.S.C. § 951(d)(4).
7 28 C.F.R. § 73.1(f). An individual can be prosecuted under Section 951 for legal
commercial transactions if the individual engaging in them is an agent of Cuba or any
other country the President determines is a threat to the national security interest of the
United States, or if the individual has been convicted of espionage- or export controlrelated crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 951(e)(1)-(2)(a); see 28 C.F.R. § 73.2(a).
8 18 U.S.C. § 951(a).
9 For the technical requirements for notification, see 28 C.F.R. § 73.3. As a practical
matter, there are no reported cases in which a defendant claimed that he or she had, in
fact, notified the Attorney General of his or her prospective activities as an agent of a
foreign government.
10 Infra Part II(B)(4).
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enemies.”11 The United States lacked sufficient “war statutes.”
“[A]lmost no protection against hostile activities” existed, the law
offered “inadequate protection against the activity of hostile
propagandists,” and “the few statutes aimed to prevent breaches of
neutrality were most inadequate.”12 The United States was so
unprepared to defend itself against espionage and similar threats that
no federal agency even bore an explicit counterespionage mission.13
The United States remained neutral when the war started in 1914,
but Europe persistently tested that neutrality. As the Great Powers vied
for influence throughout the world, Germany sought to pierce the arms
embargo that the United States had imposed on Mexico while Mexico
was in a state of civil war.14 German efforts to form alliances with
Mexico and instigate conflict between Mexico and the United States
persisted, including clandestine meetings within the United States.15
Moreover, despite the neutral status of the United States, the
combination of British control of sea commerce and continued
American overseas trade and investment provided a substantial benefit
to the Entente powers allied against Germany and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire.16
11

John Lord O’Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Procs. of the 42nd
Ann. Mtg. 275, 277 (1919). John Lord O’Brian served as head of the Department of
Justice War Emergency Division from 1917 to 1919. Addressing the New York State Bar
Association after the war, he observed with pride that “[n]o other nation came through
the struggle with so little disorder and with so little interference with the civil liberty of
the individual” and noted that it “was the view of the department . . . that there should
be no repression of political agitation unless of a character directly affecting the safety
of the state.” Id. at 276-77.
12 Id. at 278-79.
13 MICHAEL J. SULICK, SPYING IN AMERICA: ESPIONAGE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE
DAWN OF THE COLD WAR 111 (2012); see Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and
Bolshevik Propaganda: Report and Hearings S. Res. 307 and S. Res. 436 Before the
Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 1388 (1919) (Testimony of A. Bruce Bielaski,
Department of Justice Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Bielaski Senate Testimony].
DOJ’s Bureau of Investigation was the forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI).
14 This led to low-level armed conflict. In 1914, the United States invaded Veracruz,
Mexico in response to a German attempt to ship arms to the Mexican government.
BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM: AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR, 1917-1918, at
43 (2014). A United States Navy vessel blocked a German ship from reaching port, and
armed conflict between American and Mexican forces resulted in casualties on both
sides. Id. at 46-47.
15 TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 62-64, 73-74, 83.
16 JUSTUS D. DOENECKE, NOTHING LESS THAN WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICA’S ENTRY INTO
WORLD WAR I 53-57, 64-65, 90-91, 125, 187 (2014); ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON: THE STRUGGLE
FOR NEUTRALITY, 1914-1915, at 105 (1960); SULICK, supra note 13, at 112; HOWARD ZINN, A
PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492-PRESENT 362 (1999); see also Letter from
Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, German Ambassador, to Robert Lansing, Secretary of
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Germany targeted transatlantic shipping with U-Boat strikes to
mitigate the benefit that the United Kingdom enjoyed from trade with
the United States.17 Tensions between the United States and the
belligerent powers increased, and after the German Navy sank the
Lusitania on May 7, 1915, President Woodrow Wilson tasked the Secret
Service with monitoring German diplomatic activities in America.18
American, British, and Mexican operatives identified several
clandestine German lines of effort within the United States.19 As a Secret
Service counterintelligence success revealed, one such effort involved a
network in the United States established to conduct sabotage operations
as well as to use economic and social manipulation to advance German
war objectives.20
Dr. Heinrich Albert, the German commercial attaché, handled the
network’s finances.21 One day in July 1915, Albert boarded a New York
City subway, accompanied by the editor of Fatherland, a pro-German
newspaper.22 After the editor’s stop, Albert fell asleep, awoke abruptly
at his own stop, and rushed off the train.23 A Secret Service agent who
had been following Albert observed that Albert left his briefcase behind
in his haste.24 The agent recovered the briefcase, which was found to
contain documents describing “a sweeping secret campaign, linked to

State (Aug. 18, 1915), in Foreign Relations 1915 Supp., 928 (Dep’t of State, Office of the
Historian, 1928) [hereinafter Bernstorff Aug. 18 Letter].
17 SULICK, supra note 13, at 112; DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 60-64; Michael Warner,
The Kaiser Sows Destruction, Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of
Intelligence (June 27, 2008), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-thestudy-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article02.html.
18 TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 71; SULICK, supra note 13, at 112; LINK, supra note 16,
at 554; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., WORLD WAR I CENTENNTIAL COMMEMORATIVE POSTER
SERVICES: THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR (2017).
19 See, e.g., TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 67-79; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note
13, at 1388-92, 1431-34, 1445-46 (describing examples of German plots).
20 SULICK, supra note 13, at 113.
21 SULICK, supra note 13, at 114-15; 3 Noted Germans Interned For War In Hunt For
Spies, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1917, at 1; Albert Defends His Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1915, at 7; Government Agents Probe Charge of $2,000,000‐A‐Week Propaganda By
Germans, THE EVENING WORLD, Aug. 16, 1915, at 3; Attaches ‘Objectionable,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
4, 1915, at 1.
22 TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 78.
23 TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 78.
24 TUCHMAN supra note 14, at 81; SULICK, supra note 13, at 114-15. Although cynics
might assume that U.S. agents may have been more proactive in acquiring the briefcase,
Albert placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking the return of his “lost”
briefcase. See SULICK, supra note 13, at 113 (quoting advertisement in The New York
Evening Telegram July 27, 1915); Ernest Wittenberg, The Thrifty Spy on the Sixth Avenue
El, AMERICAN HERITAGE (Dec. 1965), https://www.americanheritage.com/thrifty-spysixth-avenue-el.
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high-ranking German officials, of espionage, sabotage, and
propaganda.”25
Government officials provided the contents of the briefcase to
President Wilson and shared them with the New York World. News
media outlets published the documents with analysis.26 Meanwhile,
British intelligence officers intercepted John J. Archibald, an American
newspaper reporter who was carrying correspondence from German
and Austro-Hungarian officials in the United States to recipients in their
respective countries.27 That correspondence—some of which was
made public and some of which the U.S. Government initially kept
confidential after the British provided it—corroborated serious
allegations of German violations of American neutrality and clandestine
interference in American political, social, and economic affairs.28 The
German government conducted this campaign using commercial
transactions and other interactions that concealed German
participation.
The German plans included not only schemes for sabotage and
potential attacks on the United States, but also efforts to conduct
influence operations, prevent the supply of war materiel to the Allies,
and obtain technology and supplies for Germany. These latter types of
activity did not violate any then-existing criminal law. For example,
German agents established the “German Information Bureau” in New

25

David Greenberg, The Hidden History of the Espionage Act, SLATE, Dec. 27, 2010,
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/12/the-real-purpose-of-the-espionageact.html; see also O’Brian, supra note 11, at 284 (referring to secret German plans
including the recruitment of U.S. citizens to engage in espionage); LINK, supra note 16, at
554-55; SULICK, supra note 13, at 115.
26 LINK, supra note 16, at 555 & n.8; TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 78-79; DOENECKE,
supra note 16, at 114; Lansing Lays German Propaganda Evidence Before President
Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1915, at 1-2 (citing reports that DOJ possessed “a mass of
information tending to show that German agents had been working in this country with
a view to helping the cause of the Teutonic allies” and including three pages describing
various German plots); How Germany has Worked in U.S. to Shape Opinion, Block the
Allies, and Get Munitions for Herself, Told in Secret Agents’ Letters, N.Y. WORLD, Aug. 15,
1915; see also, e.g., ROSS J. WILSON, NEW YORK AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR: SHAPING AN
AMERICAN CITY 110 (2014) (describing publication by the World of documents detailing
German efforts).
27 TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 79-80, 83; Germans Sought Aircraft Control, Bielaski
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1918, at 1, 3; Plot to Tie Up U.S. Munitions Plants Told In Alleged
Letter of Austrian Envoy Seized From Capt. Archibald, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1915, at 1;
Bielaski Senate Testimony at 1463-84.
28 Letter from The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State (Sep. 3,
1915) reprinted in Foreign Relations 1915 Supp. at 936, available at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1915Supp/d773; see
TUCHMAN,
supra note 14, at 82, 85; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1468-84.
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York to circulate pro-German news stories.29 The Bureau was not
publicly linked to the German government.30 Among other tactics, the
Bureau operated at least one high-profile American journalist as an
agent and planted him in the Hearst media organization as a Berlin
correspondent.31 To the public, the Bureau appeared to be run by an
American.32
In the spring of 1915, “a syndicate of German American
businessmen backed by Berlin” bought the New York Evening Mail.33
This purchase was organized by the German Information Bureau
leadership.34 The group purchased the newspaper through an
intermediary to obfuscate its true ownership.35 This purchase was part
of a German effort to control American English-language newspapers to
foster anti-war sentiment. As A. Bruce Bielaski, Chief of the DOJ Bureau
of Investigation, stated unequivocally to the United States Senate, “it was
the purchase by the German Government of a daily newspaper for the
purpose of influencing American public opinion.”36 Nominal American
ownership concealed German involvement.

29 Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda: Report of the
Subcomm. On the Judiciary, Pursuant to S. Res. 307 and 436, 65th Cong. 13 (1919)
[hereinafter Overman Report] (referring to organization also as “German Information
Service”); Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1389, 1445.
30 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1389.
31 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1393-94.
32 Overman Report, supra note 29, at 13-14 (“[I]n the early stages of the bureau’s
operation publicity was given to the fact that the bureau was ‘conducted by [a known
publicity agent],’ at the request of a number of American citizens . . . . That, of course,
was done to deceive the public, because the bureau was organized, financed, and
directed by the official representatives of Germany.”); Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra
note 13, at 1389-95 (same; adding that the second head of the Bureau, an American
journalist, was a “secret agent of the German Government”); see REIHNARD R. DOERRIES,
IMPERIAL CHALLENGE, AMBASSADOR COUNT BERNSTORFF AND GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS,
1908-1917 41 n.11, 43 (Christa D. Shannon trans., The University of Carolina Press)
(1989). The German Ambassador acknowledged German control of the Bureau and did
not address the concealment of official German control. Bernstorff Aug. 18 Letter, supra
note 16, at 930-31.
33 DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 113; see U.S. Looks Into Spy Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1915, at 1, 3; Letter from William Gibbs McAdoo to President Woodrow Wilson
(annotated) (July 9, 1917), in THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, DIGITAL EDITION 133 & n.2
(University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2017); see Rumely v. United States, 293 F. 532,
536 (2d Cir. 1923).
34 Overman Report, supra note 29, at 13.
35 DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 113; DOERRIES, supra note 32, at 54; see Rumely, 293 F.
at 536; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1454.
36 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1455; see Government Agents Probe
Charge of $2,000,000‐A‐Week Propaganda By Germans, supra note 21; Millions for Plots:
Von Bernstorff Used Vast Sum to Corrupt Public Opinion, WASH. POST, July 18, 1918, at 5;
DOERRIES, supra note 32, at 53 & n.78 (quoting the German Ambassador to the United
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That effort also contemplated controlling the American Press
Association, which would give Germany, through Albert, control over a
wire service “to spread pro-German news or to suppress anti-German
news or to make pro-German propaganda in any other way compatible
with the organization.”37
Other newspapers, most notably Fatherland, received substantial
covert funding from Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Fatherland was a reliable mouthpiece for pro-German sentiment about
the war and America’s potential entry on behalf of one side or another.38
The Albert papers revealed that “the German Government [was] the
financial backer” of the newspaper, and that Fatherland received “a
monthly bonus” from Albert.39 When the German Ambassador
responded to the public disclosure, he did not deny the German attempt
to control the newspaper’s message—rather, he merely (falsely)
claimed that the effort failed.40 Of particular note, Germany paid
Fatherland through an intermediary and sought editorial control of the
content the newspaper printed.41 Despite the Fatherland editor’s public
denials in 1915, his correspondence to Albert suggested that Germany
pay the newspaper through a specific attorney, “whose standing as [the
editor’s] legal advisor would exempt him from any possible inquiry.”42
The editor later admitted to receiving substantial funds from Germany
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.43
Germany also used clandestine operations to influence American
labor and peace movements both to sway public opinion against siding
with the Allies (including appeals based on ethnicity and nationality)
and to disrupt war-related supply chains.44 Further seeking to interrupt
American sales of munitions and equipment to the Allies, Germany used

States as writing, “I consider it urgently necessary for the future . . . to bring an Englishlanguage newspaper under our control.”).
37 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1502-03, Ex. 97.
38 See DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 21, 26, 60, 120; TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 164.
39 Government Agents Probe Charge of $2,000,000‐A‐Week Propaganda By Germans,
supra note 21; see also U.S. Looks Into Spy Propaganda, supra note 33, at 3.
40 Bernstorff Aug. 18 Letter, supra note 16, at 930.
41 U.S. Looks Into Spy Propaganda, supra note 33; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra
note 13, at 1430 (citing correspondence); Wittenberg, supra note 24.
42 U.S. Looks into Spy Propaganda, supra note 33, at 3.
43 Vireck Got $100,000 from the Germans, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1918, at 20; Bielaski
Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1432.
44 Greenberg, supra note 25; Germans Sought Aircraft Control, supra note 27, at 1, 3;
Gompers Confirms Foreign Tampering, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1915 at 5; May Involve
Embassy Men, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 17, 1915, at 1, 2; U.S. Looks into Spy Propaganda, supra note
33; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1468.
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non-attributable means to acquire supplies and intellectual property for
the sole purpose of preventing their export.
For example, German agents established the Bridgeport Projectile
Company in Connecticut. As noted above, the British Navy dominated
the Atlantic, and there was little likelihood that Germany could supply
itself by manufacturing munitions in the United States and then shipping
them to Europe.45 Rather, the Germans established the company simply
to purchase massive quantities of supplies, such as gunpowder and shell
casings, and to store those materials to prevent the Allies from
purchasing them.46 The company would take orders from Allied forces
with the intent not to fulfill them.47 When American newspapers
published information about this scheme, German officials admitted and
justified their efforts to prevent their enemies from acquiring war
materiel.48 The German establishment of a business on American soil,
its contracts with American companies, its removal of raw materials
from the U.S. marketplace, and its false promises to deliver on U.S. sales
to Allied powers, however, had all masqueraded behind notional
American ownership.49
45 See DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 64; Gompers Confirms Foreign Tampering, supra
note 44.
46 Government Agents Probe Charge of $2,000,000‐A‐Week Propaganda By Germans,
supra note 21 (“There also is proof that the German Government is building a large
munitions plant in this country for shrapnel and other explosives, and that it has a
contract for the entire output of powder of one explosives company. This German
company is now negotiating to supply the British and Russian Governments with its
product, but without any real purpose to deliver the goods.”); Idiotic Yankees Told to
Hold Their Tongues, Von Papen Writes Wife, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1915, at 3; Say Arms
Plant Controlled by Germany Sought U.S. Army Officers to Inspect Output, WASH. POST, Aug.
17, 1915, at 2; Wittenberg, supra note 24; see Eric Setzekorn, The Office of Naval
Intelligence in World War I: Diverse Threats, Divergent Responses, Studies in Intelligence
Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2017), at 45, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-forthe-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-61-no-2/pdfs/oniin-ww1.pdf.
47 Letter from Franz von Papen, German Military Attaché, the German Ministry of
War (Aug. 20, 1915) reprinted in Foreign Relations 1915 Supp., 939-40 (Dep’t of State,
Office of the Historian, 1928) [hereinafter Von Papen Aug. 20 Letter]; Gompers Confirms
Foreign Tampering, supra note 44; Germany Hid Secret Plans To Get War Supplies Here,
N.Y.
EVENING
WORLD,
Aug.
17,
1915,
at
4,
available
at
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030193/1915-08-17/ed-1/seq-3/.
48 Albert Defends His Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1915, at 7; Bernstorff Aug. 18
Letter, supra note 16, at 928 (“If we had the means and the opportunity we would buy
every munition factory in the United States, if in that way we could keep munitions from
the enemy . . . .”).
49 See generally Wittenberg, supra note 24; Germany Controls Only U.S. Source From
Which Powder Can Be Had This Year, supra note 46 (“References in the contract indicate
the desire of both parties to prevent the identity of actual control from being known . . .
.”); Ties Up Only Machinery Adapted to Making of Better Class of Shrapnel, WASH. POST,
Aug. 17, 1915, at 2; Gompers Confirms Foreign Tampering, supra note 44. The Archibald
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Germany sought to control not only materials and facilities needed
to manufacture war supplies, but also intellectual property that could
provide a critical advantage in an emerging military technology—
specifically, the airplane. In July 1915, the German consul in Chicago
wrote to Albert regarding a German plan for the
purchase of the Wright aeroplane factories in Dayton, Ohio,
which, in my opinion, hold great possibilities for us. With
some $50,000 we could acquire a control over the whole
Wright patents, and thereby over the aeroplane factories in
the whole United States, for about one year. We would
thereby probably be placed in the position of being able to
prevent the greatest part of the export of flying machines from
the United States.50
The Albert and Archibald papers, which the news media published,
provided evidence of this plot.51 It is unclear how far the plot
progressed, but the consul proposed conducting the deal between a

papers’ corroboration of this scheme was disclosed to the public. Plot to Tie Up U.S.
Munition Plants Told In Alleged Letter Of Austrian Envoy Seized From Capt. Archibald,
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1915 at 1-2 (citing New York World reporting and reprinting of von
Papen correspondence); Germany Hid Secret Plans To Get War Supplies Here, supra note
47 (“American officers are supposed to control the company. . . .”); DOERRIES, supra note
32, at 141 & n.5 (“Papen and Albert bought up war materials through firms such as the
Bridgeport Projectile Company and the Aetna Powder Company, which had been
founded particularly for this purpose by straw men, in order to delay shipments to the
Allies.”) (citations omitted). Overman Report, supra note 29, at 8.
As part of the same effort, a German agent obtained a contract to purchase from
an American company its entire output of phenol, a potentially toxic compound, which
Thomas A. Edison was manufacturing. Gompers Confirms Foreign Tampering, supra note
44; Explosive Acid Deal Cost Millions, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1915 at 2; Agreement By
Schweitzer to Buy 1,212,000 Pounds of Carbolic Acid, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1915 at 2. The
contract had also been predicated on the false assurance that the purchased phenol
would be used to produce medicine, and not explosives. Gompers Confirms Foreign
Tampering, supra note 44. Germany similarly attempted to control the supply of
chlorine, which was used in the war as a chemical weapon. U.S. Looks into Spy
Propaganda, supra note 33; Government Agents Probe Charge of $2,000,000‐A‐Week
Propaganda By Germans, supra note 21; Bernstorff Aug. 18 Letter, supra note 16, at 929.
As the soon-to-be former German Military Attaché, Captain Franz von Papen, privately
reported in a letter that was among the Archibald papers, once the true ownership of
the Bridgeport Projectile Company and the entities purchasing phenol and chlorine
were revealed, putative deals were cancelled, which of course reflects the importance of
disguising Germany’s role. Von Papen Aug. 20 Letter, supra note 47.
50 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at 1501, Ex. 95; see U.S. Looks Into Spy
Propaganda, supra note 33; Germans Sought Aircraft Control, supra note 27, at 1, 3.
51 Idiotic Yankees, supra note 46; Plot to Tie Up U.S. Munition Plants Told In Alleged
Letter Of Austrian Envoy Seized From Capt. Archibald, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1915, at 2; U.S.
Looks Into Spy Propaganda, supra note 33; Germans Sought Aircraft Control, supra note
27; Germany’s Agents Active in Promoting Labor Troubles While Arousing Cotton States
To Attack British, It Is Charged, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1915, at 1.
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Wright representative and a “local business man.”52 Internal German
correspondence included among the Archibald papers makes clear that
the Germans intended to conceal their nexus to the purchase.53
American newspapers published numerous stories reprinting and
analyzing the Albert papers, but the German Military Attaché provided
the most concise and candid assessment. Intended for receipt only by
his wife, the Attaché’s postmortem was among the Archibald papers:
I am enclosing you a few newspaper clippings which will
amuse you. They unluckily stole from the good Albert in the
Elevated a whole thick portfolio . . . and then published the
principal part of the contents. . . . In it unfortunately were also
a few very important things from my report, such as the
buying up of liquid chlorine and something about the
Bridgeport Projectile Company, as well as the documents
about the buying up of phenol (out of which explosives are
made) and the acquisition of the Wright flying machine
patents. . . . I always say to these idiotic Yankees that they
should shut their mouths, and better still be full of admiration
for all that heroism.54
The Germans thus had several objectives: propaganda and
perception management; exploitation of social and economic divisions
in American society; gaining economic control of materials critical to the
war effort; and acquisition of American intellectual property.55
Evaluating the truth of each allegation is beyond the scope of this
Article, as is the question of whether Allied governments engaged in
similar conduct to influence American participation in the war. Rather,
policymakers’ and the public’s perception of the range of German efforts
that today might be considered “non-traditional” intelligence
activities—not acts governed by the law of war or the high seas, such as
the sinking of American vessels, and not comprising classic espionage
with the objective of obtaining government secrets—is important to
understanding the national security threats that the Espionage Act and
Section 951 were designed to address. To an American public presented
with the Albert and Archibald papers, particularly in the context of the
deadly U-Boat attacks on the Lusitania and Arabic in May and August
52

Germans Sought Aircraft Control, supra note 27, at 2 (quoting P. Reiswitz Letter to
Dr. Heinrich Albert).
53 Von Papen Aug. 20 Letter, supra note 47, at 940 (noting that the disclosure was
“without importance” because the resolution of a patent dispute mooted the premise of
the plan).
54 Letter from Franz von Papen, German Military Attaché, to Martha von Papen, his
wife, reprinted in Foreign Relations 1915 Supp., 940-41 (Dep’t of State, Office of the
Historian, 1928)
55 Id.; Greenberg, supra note 25.
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1915,56 the “German government now stood convicted of a vast
undercover campaign to suborn American opinion and influence
American foreign policy.”57 Having obtained the Albert and Archibald
papers, the U.S. Government “was sufficiently informed about the
German [campaign] to leave uncertainty only about the actual extent of
the activities.”58
Most of the German conduct described in Albert’s papers and other
sources was not covered by existing criminal law or by statutes
specifically designed to counter national security threats.59 Critically,
this included clandestine German efforts to affect American media
outlets, which prompted concerns that Germany could surreptitiously
influence U.S. opinion about choosing sides in the war. As Attorney
General (AG) Thomas Watt Gregory acknowledged at the time,
Germany’s efforts to disguise its hand in disseminating pro-German
propaganda through purportedly independent media sources did not
“justify criminal prosecution against any person named, or give the
Department of Justice jurisdiction in the matter under any Federal
statute.”60 Although DOJ “constantly” investigated potential neutrality
violations, “nothing had been developed that would warrant Grand Jury
proceedings” following the Albert affair.61
Against this background, AG Gregory included in the Attorney
General’s December 1916 Annual Report to Congress a proposal for

56

DOENECKE, note 16, at 70-71, 116.
LINK, supra note 16, at 556.
58 DOERRIES, supra note 32, at 143; see Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra note 13, at
1388 (“During the war we have collected an immense amount of information. Some of
it has been in our files for a long time and some of it has only come to us comparatively
recently.”).
59 Contemporary press reports examining German activities that could violate thenextant federal laws cited German efforts to fraudulently procure American passports for
German reservists and violations of requirements, enforced by the U.S. Postal Service,
that newspapers (such as Fatherland) disclose when they have received payment for
printing certain content. See May Involve Embassy Men, supra note 26, at 2. Other
German efforts, such as sabotage of factories and ships, could be prosecuted under
existing statutes unrelated to national security. United States v. Rintelen, 233 F. 793,
794 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). The Sherman Anti-Trust Act also provided a basis to prosecute
German attempts to foment labor unrest. Eight Indicted In Teuton Plots, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1915, at 1.
60 Propaganda Inside Law: Department of Justice Finds Nothing to Warrant Federal
Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1915, at 7; see also Warner, supra note 17.
61 Propaganda Inside Law, supra note 60, at 7. The American cutouts who purchased
the Evening Mail on behalf of Germany were prosecuted under the October 1917
enactment of the Trading with the Enemy Act for conspiring to defraud the United States
Government by concealing debts they owed to Germany in association with the
financing of the purchase. Rumely, 293 F. at 533-34, 536.
57
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“Changes in Laws Affecting Neutrality and Foreign Relations.” In the
introduction of his proposal, AG Gregory stated:
From the experience of this department and of the State
Department during the past three years in the administration
of law in connection with the relations of this country with
Mexico and with the problems arising out of the European
war, it has become clear that there is urgent need of a revision
of the statute law bearing on our international relations.
Many acts committed in the U.S. in serious violation of its
sovereignty and against the peace and safety of its citizens are
not now punishable by any Federal criminal law; others are
punishable only under unsatisfactory statutes passed in
relation to conditions altogether different from those now
prevailing.62
The Attorney General sought to protect the United States and its
citizens, as well as American neutrality and obligations to other
nations.63 The proposal contained seventeen parts, the sixteenth of
which eventually became Section 951.64In addition to the Attorney
General’s introductory rationale for the proposals, each individual
proposal was accompanied by a more detailed explanation of need
62

1916 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. at 12.
Id. at 13.
64 The proposal included: (1) prohibiting interference with exports; (2) prohibiting
sabotaging or destroying cargo ships; (3) authorizing the U.S. to detain armed vessels or
vessels carrying war materiel and prohibiting individuals from sending out armed
vessels; (4) authorizing inspection of vessels and prohibiting the use of U.S. ports by
vessels involved in violations of law; (5) requiring passport applications to be made
under oath and prohibiting the fraudulent procurement of passports; (6) prohibiting
fraudulent use or counterfeiting of any U.S. Government seal; (7) enhancing Presidential
authority to control the manner of wireless and cable transmissions to belligerent
countries and ships on the high seas; (8) enhancing the prohibition against participation
in foreign military enterprises against nations with which the U.S. is at peace; (9)
authorizing seizure of arms and munitions at war that are being exported; (10)
prohibiting breaches of internment of detained foreign military or naval personnel; (11)
prohibiting falsely swearing in an affidavit with knowledge that it will be used to
influence a foreign government in relation to disputes with the U.S. to defeat any
measure of the U.S. in relation to such disputes; (12) prohibiting acquisition or
communication of information relating to the national defense obtained through U.S.
Government employment, unlawful access, or fraud; (13) prohibiting the minting or
printing of currency for insurgents in a foreign country with which the U.S. is at peace;
(14) prohibiting conspiracy to injure or destroy overseas property of a foreign country
with which the U.S. is a peace; (15) prohibiting falsely pretending to be a diplomatic,
consular, or other official of a foreign government; (16) prohibiting aliens other than
diplomatic or consular officers from acting in the U.S. as agents of foreign governments
without notice to the U.S. Government; and (17) permitting the President to use military
and naval forces to enforce U.S. neutrality and obligations under international law. Id.
at 12-24.
63

AARON (DO NOT DELETE)

2/8/2021 5:49 PM

2021] 18 U.S.C. SECTION 951 AND THE NON‐TRADITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTOR THREAT

17

except for the fourteenth, which prohibited conspiracy to injure or
destroy overseas property of a foreign government with which the
United States is at peace, and the sixteenth, which evolved into Section
951.65
As German submarine warfare against commercial vessels,
including U.S. vessels, increased in early 1917, and with Britain’s
February 1917 disclosure of the Zimmerman Telegram, Congress, at the
request of President Woodrow Wilson, declared war on Germany in
April 1917.66
2. Act of June 15, 1917
In June 1917, Congress enacted what is now referred to as the
Espionage Act to address various threats to domestic security. The Act
of June 15, 1917 was captioned, “An Act to punish acts of interference
with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of
the United States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce the
criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes.”67 The Act
contained thirteen titles, roughly tracking or incorporating most of the
proposals in the 1916 Attorney General report to Congress.68 Title VIII,
Section 3 (Disturbance of Foreign Relations) contained the precursor to
Section 951, and provided that:
Whoever, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or
attaché, shall act in the United States as an agent of a foreign
government without prior notification to the Secretary of

65 It is unclear why only these two proposals did not contain an explanation. Even
the twelfth proposal (a precursor to 18 U.S.C. § 793, which penalizes unauthorized
retention or disclosure of national defense information), the need for which was
considered self-evident, was accompanied by a statement that “[t]he necessity of
legislation of this nature against spies is obvious. The present statute . . . is incomplete
and defective.” Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
66 Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Imperial German
Government and the Government and the People of the United States and Making
Provision to Prosecute the Same, Ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (1917), available at
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/digitized-books/world-war-i-declarations/ww1gazettes/US-joint-res-declaring-war-against-Germany-2-OCR-SPLIT.pdf.
67 Pub. L. 65-24 [hereinafter 1917 Act].
68 The titles were: (I) Espionage; (II) Vessels in Ports of the United States; (III)
Injuring Vessels Engaged in Foreign Commerce; (IV) Interference with Foreign
Commerce by Violent Means; (V) Enforcement of Neutrality; (VI) Seizure of Arms and
Other Articles Intended for Export; (VII) Certain Exports in Time of War Unlawful; (VIII)
Disturbance of Foreign Relations; (IX) Passports; (X) Counterfeiting Government Seal;
(XI) Search Warrants [which had been a separate part of the Attorney General’s 1916
request]; (XII) Use of Mails; and (XIII) General Provisions.
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State shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.69
According to the House Judiciary Committee, the 1917 Act was “a
result of the recommendations of the Department of Justice and the
State Department, and these recommendations were made as a result of
the experiences of these departments during the past three years in the
administration of law in connection with the relations of this country
with Mexico and with problems arising out of the European war.”70 The
Committee report contained no specific explanation for the inclusion of
Title VIII, Section 3.
A review of two House and two Senate Conference Reports,
extensive floor debate over certain provisions in the bill, a two-day
House Judiciary Committee Hearing, and testimony by Assistant
Attorney General Charles Warren before the House Judiciary Committee
reveal no substantive discussion about the precursor to Section 951.71
Rather, Congress and the hearing witnesses were concerned principally
about the First Amendment implications of the espionage provisions
and prohibitions against inducing disaffection among soldiers and
sailors, as well as food shortages and the impact and constitutionality of
export controls.72 Thus, the only insight into the purpose of Title VIII,
Section 3 comes from general introductory statements in the Attorney
General’s 1916 report and the House Judiciary Committee, quoted
above.73

69 1917 Act, Title VIII § 3. This section was codified at Title 22, United States Code,
Section 233 and later transferred to Title 22, United States Code, Section 601, before the
1948 reorganization discussed herein. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 233 Historical Notes.
70 H.R. REP. NO. 65-30 at 9 (Apr. 25, 1917). In its report, the Judiciary Committee
devoted about a page to discussing the first five sections of Title I (Espionage), and
focused specifically on the breadth of the powers it conferred upon the Executive Branch
with respect to limiting speech and expression. Id. at 10; see also Civil Liberty in War
Time, supra note 11, at 299–302 (discussing freedom-of-speech concerns regarding Title
I of the 1917 Act). The Committee then stated that the remainder of Title I was “selfexplanatory,” and that “all the remaining sections of the amended bill are drawn with
sufficient clearness to be self-explanatory, and the committee is confident that the House
will realize the importance of the passage of each section of the amended bill.” H.R. REP.
NO. 65-30 at 10.
71 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 65-69 (June 6, 1917); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 65-65 (May 29,
1917); S. Conf. Rep. No. 65-44 (June 5, 1917); S. Conf. Rep. No. 65-37 (May 29, 1917); 55
Cong. Rec. 776-2165 (chronicling debate over fourteen days from Apr. 18, 1917 through
May 12, 1917); Espionage and Interference with Neutrality: Hearings Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Apr. 9 & 12, 1917); Hearing and
Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives (Apr. 10, 1917).
72 See supra note 71.
73 See 1916 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. at 12; H.R. Rep. 65-30 at 9.
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3. 1940 and 1948 Amendments
In 1940, Congress amended the sentencing provision of Title VIII,
Section 3, which had been codified at Title 22, United States Code,
Section 233 (Disturbance of Foreign Relations), to mandate a prison
term and raise the maximum sentence by inserting the language, “shall
be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may, in
the discretion of the court, be fined not more than $5,000.” This change
was part of a general increase in sentences for violations of the 1917
Act.74 The House Judiciary Committee emphasized, without reference to
any specific section, the importance of the “certainty of punishment”
and a desire for “firmer administration of the criminal law, and sterner
punishment of . . . convicted criminals.”75
In 1948, as part of an overhaul of the United States Code, Congress
repealed Title VIII, Section 3, which had been moved to Title 22, United
States Code, Section 601, and re-enacted it without substantive changes
as Title 18, United States Code, Section 951 within Chapter 45 (Foreign
Relations).76 In effecting this change, Congress stated that “[n]o
inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the
chapter in Title 18 . . . in which any particular section is placed, nor by
reason of the catchlines used in such title.”77
4. Cold War-Era Amendments
During the Cold War, Congress considered proposed changes to
Section 951 to address perceived shortcomings in the statute, cover new
threats, and to clarify the statute’s scope.
i. 1982 Legislative Proposal
In 1982, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism held a hearing on two bills, one of which, Senate Bill 1963,
would have substituted the Attorney General for the Secretary of State
in Section 951, increased potential punishment for violations of the
statute, required the Attorney General to promulgate regulations
defining “agent of a foreign government,” and required the Attorney
General to transmit to the Secretary of State notifications that DOJ
received.78 Senate Bill 1963 was not enacted, but because it contained
74

Pub. L. No. 76-443.
H.R. Rep. 76-1716, at 2 (March 7, 1940).
76 Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62. Stat. 683 at 743, 862 (June 25, 1948).
77 Id., 62 Stat. at 862.
78 Communist Bloc Intelligence Gathering Activities on Capitol Hill: Hearing on S. 1959
and S. 1963 Before the Subcomm. On Sec. and Terrorism of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., Ser. No. J-97-116 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 SJC Hearing].
75
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some provisions similar to later amendments to Section 951,
Congressional and DOJ discussion of the proposal reflect the aims of
those subsequent amendments.
The subcommittee explained that requiring foreign agents to notify
the Attorney General instead of the Secretary of State would enable
effective enforcement of Section 951, and noted that the statute’s
“usefulness [had] been demonstrated repeatedly in espionage
prosecutions, where its violation is often used as a secondary offense
and as an investigative predicate for the FBI.”79 The subcommittee did
not discuss the scope of conduct that Section 951 covered.
Witness testimony regarding Senate Bill 1963 focused on
sufficiency of notice, interagency communication, and defining “agent of
a foreign government.”80 John Martin, then the Chief of DOJ’s Internal
Security Section,81 stated in response to questioning that DOJ would
generally not prosecute an individual who had notified any U.S.
Government department.82 Citing an example raised earlier in the
hearing involving friendly law enforcement or intelligence officers
working jointly in the U.S. with American agencies, Martin stated that
DOJ’s “efforts are to get at those people who are dispatched and carry
on secret and clandestine activities. And they usually give notice to no
one . . . for practical purposes of enforcing the statute we do not have
any notification by hostile intelligence services who are dispatching
agents.”83
ii. Amendments to Section 951
Section 951 was amended in 1983, 1984, 1986, 1993, and 1994.
The 1983 and 1994 amendments only addressed sentencing.84 The
1986 amendment added subsection (e), which listed the Soviet Union
and Warsaw Pact nations in addition to Cuba.85 The 1993 amendment
removed the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations.86
The 1984 amendment added subsections (b), (c), and (d) and
substituted the Attorney General for the Secretary of State as the official

79

Id. at 4.
Id. at 19, 20, 26, 34, 37.
81 Id. at 27.
The Internal Security Section was the forerunner of the
Counterespionage Section, now the Counterintelligence & Export Control Section.
82 Id.
83 1982 SJC Hearing, supra note 78, at 27.
84 Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XXXIII § 330016(1)(R) (Sept. 13, 1994); Pub. L. No. 97462 § 6 (Jan. 12, 1983).
85 Pub. L. No. 99-569, Title VII § 703 (Oct. 27, 1986).
86 Pub. L. No. 103-199, Title II § 202 (Dec. 17, 1993).
80
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to whom a foreign agent must provide notice.87 The 1984 amendments
were part of a much larger bill and appeared to be part of a years-long
effort to reform federal criminal law.88
The 1984 Congressional Reports did not discuss the amendments
to Section 951.89 The 1983 Senate Judiciary Committee report on Senate
Bill 1762, which was substantially the same as the 1984 amendment,
however, noted that the State Department had never promulgated
regulations regarding notification, and that it was awkward for the State
Department to administer the statute while engaging in foreign
relations.90 Regarding the new exclusions from the scope of the statute,
the Committee stated:
The proposed Act is not intended to cover those individuals in
routine commercial matters but is intended to cover
individuals who represent foreign governments in political
activities that may or may not come within the scope of the
Foreign Agent [sic] Registration Act. By excluding from the
notification requirement several classes of individuals who
are presently covered, the proposal also limits the coverage of
the statute by focusing only on those in whom the United
States Government has a necessary interest.91
This does not appear to evince an intent to limit the application of
the statute beyond the exclusions that were added in 1984, but rather
to explain the carve-outs. While the statement regarding the
commercial transaction exclusion could be read to limit the application
of Section 951 to activities that could be considered “political” (which
were not defined), it was more likely intended to explain why routine
commercial matters were excluded. The statement thus evinces an
understanding and intent that Section 951 covers a broader scope of
activity than FARA. By enumerating specific exceptions to that scope,
the amendment affirmed the otherwise broad sweep of conduct that
Section 951 criminalizes if—and only if—undertaken on behalf of a
foreign government. Moreover, the other exclusions this amendment
added carved out categories of agents for which a notification
requirement would consume administrative resources without serving
a useful purpose: accredited diplomatic and consular officers, officially
87

Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, Ch. XII, Part G § 1209 (Oct. 12, 1984).
See, e.g., Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981, S. REP. NO. 97-307 (Dec. 22, 1981)
(discussing S. 1630, which was not enacted); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983,
S. REP. NO. 98-225 (Sept. 14, 1983) (discussing S. 1762, which was not enacted).
89 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 98-1159 (Oct. 10, 1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1030 (Sept.
17, 1984).
90 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 415.
91 Id.
88
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and publicly acknowledged and sponsored representatives of foreign
governments, and their non-U.S. citizen staff. Congress thus appears to
have added the exclusions in response to concerns about the undue
burdens of enforcing the statute in its previous form.92
In sum, the 1984 amendment was not accompanied by any
statement of Congressional intent regarding the scope of the statute,
beyond the limitations added to the face of the law.
III. REPORTED CASES RELEVANT TO SCOPE OF CONDUCT
As discussed below, early cases established the breadth of Section
951 and how its focus on agency distinguishes it from core
counterespionage statutes. Several later cases more directly addressed
the scope of conduct the statute can cover.
In several cases examining Section 951, courts have declined to
find limits on the scope of conduct that, when engaged in on behalf of a
foreign government, can constitute “acting as an agent of a foreign
government.” As the Third Circuit stated in United States v. Butenko,93 a
clear case of Soviet information-gathering about U.S. Strategic Air
Command systems, “[t]he cases assume that it means one who acts
directly or indirectly for the benefit of a foreign government.”94 No
reported cases have found that particular conduct could not be
prosecuted under the statute (other than conduct excluded on the face
of the statute), as long as the other statutory elements are met. Most
reported cases in which courts have found that conduct other than
information-gathering violated the statute have involved defendants
linked directly to foreign intelligence services, as have those reported
cases in which DOJ charged Section 951 for non-information-gathering
conduct, although there is no authority indicating such a connection is
legally necessary.
A. Early Cases
Early prosecutions from the period between the two World Wars
illustrate the breadth of conduct that Section 951 covers. In United
States v. Buerk,95 the trial court found that the indictment properly
charged a defendant for not only “mak[ing] investigations and
obtain[ing] information” to report to German officials, but also
92 See 1982 SJC Hearing, supra note 78, at 4 (referencing State Department concerns
“that, given the vast numbers of nondiplomatic individuals . . . the application and
enforcement of the act is impractical”).
93 United States v. Butenko, 384 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967).
94 Id. at 566.
95 United States v. Buerk, 38 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (charging 22 U.S.C. § 233).
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“mak[ing] representations and promises to divers and numerous
persons, who were then and there skilled laborers, for the purpose of
inducing said persons to leave the United States for Germany and reside
in Germany and aid the said Government of Germany” from 1937 to
1940.96 Recruiting a skilled labor force for a country with which the
United States was not then at war exemplifies conduct outside
traditional “espionage-like” techniques; that conduct was rendered
illegal because the defendant acted on behalf of Germany.97
Similarly, in United States v. Heine,98 the Second Circuit found that
a defendant’s gathering of unclassified information, generally from
public sources, about production capacity, output, and locations of
American aircraft manufacturers for transmission to Germany before
the U.S. entry into the Second World War violated the predecessor to
Section 951.99 The court explicitly found that the defendant did not
violate the predecessor to Section 794, which penalizes “core”
espionage.100 The court noted that there was nothing illegal about
gathering or sending the information at issue in the case—the critical
element in affirming the defendant’s conviction was that he acted “as an
agent for the Reich.”101
B. United States v. Duran
United States v. Duran102 provides an example of DOJ’s decision to
charge under Section 951 a defendant who did not engage in conduct
amounting to traditional espionage, of aggressive DOJ arguments
regarding the purpose and scope of Section 951, and of an appellate
court’s refusal to find limits on the statute’s application beyond its text
based on a careful review of the statute and its history.103 In Duran, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction under Section 951
for his part in the Government of Venezuela’s effort to cover up the
“Suitcase Scandal” between Venezuela and Argentina.104
As
background, the scandal developed when a dual citizen of Venezuela
and the United States attempted to smuggle $800,000 into Argentina,

96
97
98
99
100

§ 794.
101
102
103
104

Id. at 410.
Id.
United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. 815-17.
Id. at 817 (discussing 50 U.S.C. § 32); see 50 U.S.C.A. § 32 Historical Note; 18 U.S.C.
Heine, 151 F.2d at 817.
United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1294-96.
Id. at 1286.
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was caught, and fled to the United States.105 The news media speculated
that the cash was evidence that the Venezuelan and Argentinian
governments had been facilitating the transfer of large sums of money
from a state-owned Venezuelan energy monopoly to Venezuela’s
favored candidate in the Argentinian presidential election.106 The
defendant, who was implicated in the scandal because the suspected
courier had listed him on a customs form, contacted Venezuela’s
intelligence agency, the Direccíon de los Servicios de Inteligencia y
Prevencíon (DISIP), who informed the defendant that the DISIP would
be handling the scandal.107 The defendant and his brother, a DISIP
agent, made a variety of efforts to secure the suspected courier’s
cooperation in the DISIP-coordinated cover-up, including providing
falsified documents and attempting to induce the courier to sign a power
of attorney.108 The defendant was convicted of violating Section 951.109
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the statute was vague.110
The defendant also argued that the statute obliges individuals to notify
the Attorney General only of conduct involving espionage or subversive
activity and that only an individual engaged in espionage or subversive
activity could have knowledge of the notification requirement.111
Responding to similar vagueness arguments at trial, the Government
argued that “[t]he word ‘act’ has a plain and ordinary meaning and
requires no further definition,” citing as dictionary definitions
“[p]erform an action,” “[b]ehave in a certain manner,” and “[d]ischarge
one’s duties.”112
The Government further emphasized at trial that the criminal
conduct underlying Section 951 was not failing to register, but rather
acting as an agent of a foreign government without notifying the
Attorney General.113 Notably, addressing the purpose of the statute, the
Government argued that:
Congress had good reason for writing the statute as it did.
Allowing individuals an unfettered right to act as agents for
foreign governments inside the United States, without the
knowledge of the Attorney General or his designees, would
105

Id. at 1287.
Id.
107 Id.
108 Duran, 596 F.3d. at 1287-88.
109 Id. at 1290.
110 Id. at 1286.
111 Id. at 1291-92.
112 Government’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Duran, 2008 WL
2740392, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2008).
113 Id. at 4.
106
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allow the United States to become a haven for worldwide
espionage and criminal activity, causing direct and indirect
harm in this country. Congress rightly determined that the
unique freedoms and protections available on United States soil
should not be used by foreign states to advance their own ends,
and that, if a foreign state wants its agents to engage in
activities on United States soil, United States officials are
entitled to know about the presence of these individuals and
either bar them or take precautions.114
On appeal, the Government reiterated that of the three components
of a Section 951 violation—acting, failing to notify, and serving a foreign
government—”the first two are self-evident and require no
elaboration,” and “the third is clearly comprehensible to persons of
ordinary intelligence and, in any event, is further explicated by its
accompanying regulation.”115 The Government further argued that,
since 1917, Section 951 and its predecessors were “always, in pertinent
part, directed at subversive activities in the United States other than
espionage—that is, [Section 951’s] forebear provision was intended to,
and has always outlawed [sic] foreign agents from seeking to interfere
in the United States with private, non-governmental entities.”116
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Government and, in very
clear terms, rejected the idea that Section 951 was confined to activities
similar to traditional espionage.117 It found that “nothing in § 951 is, in
the context before us, vague” and that the text of the statute was “clear
and unambiguous.”118 The court agreed that the defendant’s actions, not
status, as an agent were subject to the statute.119
The Eleventh Circuit further concluded that, based on the plain
language of the statute, the legislative history, and case law, the scope of
Section 951 was not limited to subversive activity or “espionagerelated” conduct.120 Rather, “the activities that fall within § 951’s
purview have never been expressly or by judicial interpretation limited
to those bearing upon national security or even those which by their
114

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
Government’s Reply Brief, United States v. Duran, 2009 WL 6338811, at *31 (Aug.
14, 2009).
116 Id. at *33, *35-*36 (citing as evidence that Section 951 was intended to cover
conduct “precisely” such as the defendants’ conduct the facts that other provisions of
the 1917 Act, later codified elsewhere in Title 18, prohibit espionage, and that Section
951 is contained within the “Foreign Relations” chapter of Title 18, not the “Espionage”
chapter); but see Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. at 862, discussed in Part II(B)(3), supra.
117 Duran, 596 F.3d at 1293.
118 Id. at 1291.
119 Id. at 1293 n.2.
120 Id. at 1293.
115
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nature are criminal or inherently wrongful.”121 Although the court
found that the statute was sufficiently clear on its face to render resort
to legislative history unnecessary, the court reviewed the history of the
1917 Act, and noted that “over time, the original 1917 Act broke off into
three directions to form three separate registration or notification
statutes dealing with agents of foreign governments.”122 The court then
distinguished Section 951 from FARA and 50 U.S.C. § 851, the espionagespecific registration requirement, and determined that Congress
intended Section 951 to be a “catchall statute that would cover all
conduct taken on behalf of a foreign government.”123 Accordingly,
Section 951 “reaches beyond” both FARA and 50 U.S.C. § 851
classifications to “any affirmative conduct undertaken as an agent of a
foreign government.”124 Thus, the “broad sweep of § 951 creates a
plethora of possibilities under which those engaged in purportedly legal
conduct on behalf of a foreign government” could be subject to
prosecution.125 In a footnote, however, the court reserved the
possibility that government attempts to include purely innocent activity
within the scope of Section 951 might raise constitutional concerns.126
C. United States v. Dumeisi
The defendant in United States v. Dumeisi,127 who published an
Arabic-language newspaper in Illinois, engaged in a combination of
information-gathering and other activity on behalf of Iraq.128 He
volunteered to the Iraqi Mission to the United Nations (IMUN) to publish
materials or articles it supplied, described his newspaper as “a
newspaper for Iraq” while requesting financial support from an Iraqi
Intelligence Service (IIS) officer, received equipment and articles from
IMUN and IIS personnel, and provided press credentials for thencurrent and former IIS officers.129 The defendant also met with
members of the IIS, and received at least one cash payment.130 He also
discussed monitoring activities of the Iraqi opposition in the United
121

Id.
Id. at 1294 & nn.4-5.
123 Duran, 596 F.3d at 1294-95, 1294 n.6.
124 Id. at 1295.
125 Id. (noting the role of prosecutorial discretion).
126 Id. at 1296 n.9 (“Because Duran’s conduct was not innocent, we need not in this
case express an opinion as to the constitutionality of possible applications of § 951 to
completely innocent conduct.”).
127 United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2005).
128 Id. at 570, 581.
129 Id. at 570, 571.
130 Id. at 570-71, 581, 582.
122

AARON (DO NOT DELETE)

2/8/2021 5:49 PM

2021] 18 U.S.C. SECTION 951 AND THE NON‐TRADITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTOR THREAT

27

States, gathered information about a prominent opposition figure for
the IMUN, surreptitiously recorded a meeting with an opposition figure,
and published incendiary articles to provoke Iraqi Opposition members
in the United States into revealing themselves.131
The court affirmed that the defendant’s gathering information for
a foreign government violated Section 951.132 The court also listed as
further evidence of a Section 951 violation the defendant receipt from
the IIS payments and directions on how to use a human asset, offering
to publish articles for the IMUN, receipt of training and tasking to report
on opposition activities, weekly telephone conferences with the IMUN
to receive instructions, receipt of covert recording equipment, and
providing false press credentials to enable IMUN employees to access
places where they could not have traveled as diplomats.133 This
demonstrates the court’s view that any of these acts could satisfy
Section 951.
Notably, in later discussing Dumeisi’s conviction in testimony
before a House Judiciary subcommittee in 2008, Patrick Rowan, then
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General of DOJ’s National Security
Division, described the defendant as having been convicted of “violating
[S]ection 951 for his activities spying on Iraqi dissidents in the United
States for Saddam Hussein.”134 Mr. Rowan continued, “Dumeisi is a good
example of how we can use 18 U.S.C. Section 951 against somebody who
wasn’t involved in collecting classified information but was nonetheless
working in this country on behalf of a foreign government.”135
D. United States v. Latchin
In United States v. Latchin,136 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
defendant’s conviction under Section 951 for undertaking activities on
behalf of the IIS, even though the court did not determine what the
defendant actually did on the IIS’s behalf.137 The defendant had joined
the IIS well before moving to the United States, and appeared to have
moved to the United States without being aware that he had been

131

Id. at 570, 571, 573.
Dumeisi 424 F.3d at 581.
133 Id. at 581.
134 Enforcement of Federal Espionage Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6 (2008)
(testimony of J. Patrick Rowan, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice) (emphasis added).
135 Id.
136 United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2009).
137 Id. at 715.
132
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chosen to be an IIS “sleeper agent.”138 Still, he traveled to Eastern
Europe several times to meet with an IIS handler and received payments
from the handler.139 The court did not require evidence of espionage:
“Whether [the defendant] actually spied . . . may be another matter
altogether.”140 Indeed, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction
under Section 951 because there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence—receiving money from IIS personnel overseas and placing
thirty-nine telephone calls to the IIS second-in-command of the sleeper
program—for the jury to conclude that the defendant “took acts of some
kind on behalf of Iraq” without notifying the Attorney General.141
IV. ADDITIONAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER SECTION 951
A review of indictments and plea agreements in other cases in
which DOJ charged violations of Section 951 in roughly the first ten
years of this century reveals that most fall into one of two categories:
information-gathering and procurement or sanctions evasion.142 In
addition, most involve defendants who worked with foreign intelligence
services.143
The defendants in most cases gathered information for foreign
governments, primarily China, Russia, Iraq, and Cuba.144
The
defendants in several cases procured or sought to procure technology

138

Id. at 711.
Id.
140 Id. at 715.
141 Id.
142 Cases involving multiple defendants are referenced as a single case. This analysis
does not discuss certain cases under seal or for which records were not available.
143 See infra notes 145, 146.
144 United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bidawid,
No. 2:07-cr-20389 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2007), ECF No. 3, (Nov. 29, 2007), ECF No. 4
(indictment dismissed due to defendant’s death); United States v. Chun, No. 1:16-cr00518 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016), ECF No. 3, (Jan. 23, 2017), ECF No. 16; United States v. AlAwadi, No. 2:07-cr-20314 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2007), ECF No. 24; United States v.
Alvarez, 506 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2007); United States v. Ali, No. 1:06-cr-00292
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011), ECF No. 204; United States v. Aquino, No. 2:05-cr-00719 (D. N.J.
Oct. 6, 2005), ECF No. 16; United States v. Buryakov, No. 1:15-cr-00073 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,
2015), ECF No. 10; United States v. Chapman, No. 1:10-cr-00598, (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2010),
ECF No. 16; United States v. Chiu, No. 8:05-cr-00293, (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2007), ECF No.
584; United States v. Chung, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2009); United States v.
Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2005; United States v. Gari, No. 1:01-cr-00810 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 4, 2001), ECF No. 2; United States v. Kang, No. 1:08-cr-00210 (E.D. Va. May 28,
2008), ECF No. 43-46; United States v. Nicholson, No. 3:09-cr-00040, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45126 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2010), ECF No. 185, 186. These cases are presented solely
to demonstrate how facts were alleged to establish violations of Section 951 and/or
conspiracy to violate Section 951.
139
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for foreign governments, evaded sanctions, or both.145 Of the
information-gathering and procurement cases, four also involved other
activities such as perception management.146
Recent cases often reflect contemporary analogs of the nation-state
actions that prompted the enactment of the Espionage Act a century ago.
Two defendants are currently charged with obtaining positions at an
American social media company to gain inside access to customer
information at the direction of a foreign government.147 Amin Yu, acting
as an agent of the PRC, procured items in the United States for use in the
PRC’s development of autonomous underwater vehicles.148 Alexander
Fishenko used a U.S.-based company to obtain and provide to Russia $50
million worth of microelectronics and other technology.149 Russian
national Maria Butina agreed to act in the United States under the
direction of a Russian government official.150 Subject to that direction,
she “sought to establish unofficial lines of communication with
Americans having power and influence . . . for the benefit of the Russian
Federation.”151 Evgeny Buryakov acted as an undeclared agent of
Russian intelligence and, in that capacity, developed a plan to exert
pressure on a union to benefit Russia, attempted to obtain sensitive
technical information relating to stock-trading, and conducted other
145 See U.S. v. Fishenko, No. 1:12-cr-00626 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 266; Press
Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Russian Agent Sentenced to Ten
Years for Acting as Unregistered Russian Government Agent and Leading Scheme to
Illegally Export Controlled Technology to Russian Military (Jul. 21, 2016) (available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-agent-sentenced-10-years-actingunregistered-russian-government-agent-and-leading); United States v. Huang, No. 3:06cr-00102, (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2006), ECF No. 1, (Dec. 11, 2016) ECF No. 41 (guilty plea to
18 U.S.C. § 1001); U.S. v. Moo, No. 1:06-cr-20006 (S.D. Fla 2006), ECF No. 36, (Aug. 1,
2006), ECF No. 122; U.S. v. Sudarshan, No. 1:07-cr-00051 (D.D.C. March 7, 2007), ECF
No. 1 (reference made only to factual allegation in indictment); United States. v.
Shemami, 425 Fed. Appx. 425 (2011). These cases are presented solely to demonstrate
how facts were alleged to establish violations of Section 951 and/or conspiracy to
violate Section 951.
146 Campa, 529 F.3d at 1002 (“sowing disinformation” on behalf of Cuban
intelligence); Dumeisi, 424 F.3d at 579 (publishing newspaper articles at the direction
of Iraqi intelligence); United States v. Shaaban, 252 Fed. Appx. 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2007)
(proposal for U.S.-based TV station funded by Iraqi intelligence); Duran, 596 F.3d at
1287-88 (influencing a witness on behalf of Venezuelan intelligence).
147 See e.g., United States v. Abouammo et. al., No. 3:19-cr-00621 (N.D. Cal. July 28,
2020), ECF No. 53. All defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
This case is referenced only to illustrate the assessment that the facts alleged are
sufficient to establish the elements of Section 951.
148 United States v. Yu, No. 6:16-cr-00023 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2016), ECF No. 39.
149 U.S. v. Fishenko, No. 1:12-cr-00626 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 266; see
Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, supra note 145.
150 U.S. v. Butina, No. 1:18-cr-00218 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2018) ECF No. 66, at 1.
151 Id. at 2.
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collection and influence activities.152 Jun Wei Yeo acted on behalf of PRC
intelligence services “to spot and assess Americans with access to
valuable non-public information.”153 These cases reflect foreign
governments’ persistent use of “non-traditional” actors to engage in
clandestine efforts to collect information, obtain sensitive technology,
and exert unattributed or misattributed influence within the United
States. In other words, the same threats that motivated the enactment
of the predecessor to Section 951 remain active national security
concerns today.154

152 Press Release, Russian Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Russian
Banker Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 30 Months in Prison For Conspiring to
Work
for
Russian
Intelligence,
(May
25,
2016)
(available
at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/russian-banker-sentenced-manhattanfederal-court-30-months-prison-conspiring-work).
153 United States v. Yeo, No. 1:20-cr-00087 (D. D.C. July 24, 2020), ECF No. 9 at 1.
154 There have been acquittals in prosecutions under Section 951. While juries of
course do not provide reasons for acquittals, in one case, United States v. Fondren, the
trial judge entered an order of acquittal. The order, however, did not address the scope
of conduct. The district judge granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal on one count
of conspiracy to violate Section 951 and one count of aiding and abetting the violation
of Section 951, but the defendant’s jury conviction of unlawful communication of
classified information by a government employee (50 U.S.C. § 783(a)) was affirmed on
appeal. See United States v. Fondren, 417 Fed. Appx. 327, 333 (4th Cir. 2011). The
transcript of the district court’s acquittal on the Section 951-related charges reveals that
the decision had nothing to do with the scope of conduct the statute covers. Rather, it
was based on the defendant’s lack of knowledge that the individual to whom he provided
information was an agent of a foreign government during the time covered by the two
Section 951-related counts of the indictment. United States v. Fondren, No. 1:09-cr00263, 59-60, 70 (E.D. Va. 2009), ECF No. 110.
In United States v. Turner, DOJ charged the defendant with Section 951 and FARA
violations based on his involvement in lobbying and public relations on behalf of a
foreign government, but the defendant was acquitted at trial of the Section 951 count.
United States v. Turner, No. 1:13-cr-00572-2, 2014 WL 4699708, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
ECF No. 38, 212. The defendant was convicted of an export control charge under IEEPA.
Similarly, in United States v. Amirnazmi, 648 F. Supp. 2d 718 (E.D. Pa. 2009), the
defendant was convicted at trial of a charge brought under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), apparently involving illegal exports to Iran, but was
acquitted of violating Section 951.
Finally, in United States v. Rafiekian, the trial court examined not the scope of
conduct that Section 951 could encompass, but rather the boundaries of an “agency”
relationship that would satisfy the statute. United States v. Rafiekian, 2019 WL 4647254
(E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2019), at *10-12. After a jury found the defendant guilty of violating,
inter alia, Section 951, the court applied a common-law definition of agency to the
statute and found that no rational juror could find such a relationship between the
defendant and a foreign government. The court further found insufficient evidence that
the defendant operated subject to a foreign government’s “direction and control.” Id. at
*13-14. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal. Id. at *1.
The Government has appealed that decision. Id., appeal docketed, No. 19-4803 (4th Cir.
Oct. 31, 2019); see Judges May Reinstate Foreign Agent Case Against Flynn Partner,
POLITICO,
Dec.
12,
2020,
available
at
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V. APPLICATION TO CURRENT THREATS
As suggested in the Introduction, the United States confronts
twenty-first century threats from Russia and the PRC, among others,
that are analogous to the German covert activity that prompted the
enactment of the Espionage Act, including the predecessor to Section
951, in the first instance. The United States Intelligence Community
formally notified the public of its assessment that:
Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election
represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s
longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal
democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a
significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope
of effort compared to previous operations. . . .
Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging
strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as
cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government
agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and
paid social media users or “trolls.”155
Meanwhile, the United States Senate Subcommittee on
Investigations under the committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs, issued a detailed report regarding the PRC’s use of
programs, collectively referred to as “Talent Plans,” to obtain the benefit
of U.S.156 research and development efforts by recruiting “researchers,
scientists, and experts in the public and private sector to provide China
with knowledge and intellectual capital in exchange for monetary gain
and other benefits.”157 According to the Subcommittee findings, Talent
Plan participants receive specific taskings from the PRC government,
including applying knowledge gained from their U.S.-based work to
fulfill their Talent Plan contract, recruiting and training additional
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/12/michael-flynn-foreign-agent-case444743.
155 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) 2017-01D (Jan. 6, 2017) (Declassified
Version) at ii, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
156 The Talent Plan programs do not exclusively target the United States, but only
their operation in the United States is directly relevant to this Article.
157 U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Perm. Subcomm. on
Investigations, Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment
Plans (Nov. 18, 2019) at 1 [hereinafter PSI Report], available at Whereas the global
ambitions of WWI-era Imperial Germany, consistent with the era, focused on prestige
and control of land, the PRC seeks to advance its geopolitical position through, inter alia,
economic, scientific, and technological superiority. Id. at 1-2, 7.
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participants, and sponsoring visiting students.158
To be clear,
participation in the Talent Plans is not in and of itself illegal. Recent
cases, however, have alleged that recruiters and participants have
concealed the support or direction they receive from the PRC.159 The
Senate investigation found that such deception is an intrinsic feature of
the Talent Plan programs.160 Such concealment or deliberate failure to
make a required disclosure may constitute precisely the type of covert
nation-state conduct that Section 951 is designed to expose, deter, and
punish. As several courts have emphasized, a defendant may be
convicted under Section 951 for undertaking an act in the United States
at the direction or control of a foreign government even if the act itself
is not illegal.161 Rather, concealing the foreign hand that directs and
controls the actor constitutes the threat.
The threats of undisclosed foreign influence in American politics
and society and of covert foreign engagement in American economic,
scientific, and technological activities,162 remain significant national
security challenges. The recent and ongoing prosecutions under Section
951 described above, as well as the trends that DOJ, the FBI, and the
Senate have identified as discussed above, reflect the persistent nature
of those threats.163 Recognizing that today’s threats are on a continuum
158

PSI Report, supra note 157, at 27-30.
United States v. Ye, No. 1:20-cr-10021 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2020), ECF No. 1. See e.g.,
Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Harvard University
Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases
(Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-andtwo-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related (last visited Oct. 19,
2020). The details contained in the charging documents are allegations. The defendants
are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a
court of law. Pending cases are referenced herein solely to illustrate the application of
law to the facts alleged.
160 PSI Report, supra note 157, at 29 (“Some contract provisions reflect an intent to
keep the [Talent Plan] members’ work in China secret.”). A more recent report, from the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, also called for recognition of Russia’s use of
non-traditional intelligence actors. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence,
United States Senate, on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the
2016 U.S. Election, Vol. 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities, at 933-34,
161 Latchin, 554 F.3d at 715; United States v. Ji, No. 1:18-cr-00611 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7,
2020), ECF No. 90, at 2.
162 It bears emphasizing that foreign participation in many aspects of the American
economy and educational system, including scientific and technological research, are
entirely appropriate and indeed beneficial. Concealing or failing to make required
disclosure of foreign involvement, however, deprives stakeholders in the United States
of the knowledge that they are dealing with foreign governments, and thus prevents
them from factoring that involvement into their decision-making.
163 Foreign intelligence activities such as influence operations and theft of
information that occur using “cyber” means have generally not been charged under
Section 951. Rather, such conduct is more often charged under the Computer Fraud and
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with those that prompted the enactment of Section 951 and to which
law enforcement has historically applied the statute is essential to
understanding how and when the statute could be applied in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The adversaries of the United States continue to deploy strategies
and tactics that prompted the enactment of the Espionage Act, including
the predecessor to Section 951, more than one hundred years ago.
Those strategies include the use of undisclosed agents to conduct
campaigns of interference in American political, social, economic,
scientific, and technological leadership and independence. As the
history of Section 951 set forth above demonstrates, it is important for
legal practitioners and those who act in the United States on behalf of
foreign governments to understand the broad scope of conduct that the
statute renders illegal if undertaken at the undisclosed direction of a
foreign government, regardless of whether the actor is a classic “spy.”
Those who conceal their taskings by foreign governments deprive the
United States of information critical to informed decision-making, which
in turn lies at the core of autonomy and independence. Section 951 will
hold them to account.

Abuse Act and/or as Economic Espionage, Wire Fraud, or related offenses. See e.g.,
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For Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations And A Labor Organization For
Commercial Advantage,” May 19, 2014, available at https://www.justice.gov/usaowdpa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-uscorporations-and. Such charging decisions may obviate the need to assess whether an
overseas cyber actor “acts in the United States” for the purpose of Section 951, given the
ready availability of statutes that offer at least as favorable sentencing potential. See e.g.,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(b), 1831, 1343.

